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INTRODUCrION
In Justice Accused, Robert Cover set out to study the phenomenon of judges
who enforce laws they themselves believe to be unjust.' He notes that with the
exception of the Nazi legal system, this phenomenon has rarely been studied.2
Cover observes that, in various periods, American judges seem to suffer from
an irresolvable tension between their moral commitments and their commitment
to neutral and formal legal interpretation. Cover calls this tension the mor-
al/formal dilemma.3 To demonstrate this point, he analyzes constitutional
adjudication in the years of conflict during which Northern federal judges-
many of them committed abolitionists-enforced the Fugitive Slave Acts of
1793 and 1850 against Blacks and those who helped Blacks escape the slave-
catchers.
4
The Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 provided for federal involvement
in slave-catching in Northern states and (in 1850) established federal officers
to assist in slave-catching and penalties for obstruction of such activity.' Many
federal judges said in opinions that these two laws "forced" them to decide in
favor of slavery, an institution they considered evil.' Cover observes that the
only way these judges could confront these cases was to adopt an attitude in
which they saw the law as only a formal game.7 Of importance to the modern
1. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 197-98.
4. Id. at 119.
5. Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) [hereinafter 1793 Act] (providing for removal of alleged
slaves "upon proof to the satisfaction of such [federal] judge or [state] magistrates"); Act of September 18,
1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) [hereinafter 1850 Act] (expanding federal involvement in capture of fugitive slaves,
including providing for appointment of special federal commissioners to hear fugitive rendition proceedings
and issue certificates of removal; also establishing penalties for interfering with capture of runaways).
6. See, e.g., Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 339 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583); Norris v.
Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 326 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307); Giltner v. Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 432
(C.C.D. Mich. 1848) (No. 5,453); Vaughan v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 1115, 1116 (C.C.D. Ind. 1845) (No.
16,903); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,502); Johnson v. Tompkins,
13 F. Cas. 840, 843 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416). For state opinions, see, e.g., Sim's Case, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 285, 304 (1851); Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 57 (1837).
7. R. COVER, supra note 1, at 123-25.
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reader, however, is Cover's suggestion that the Northern judges' formalistic8
approach rested upon a theory of adjudication-legal positivism-that is as
prevalent today as it was in 1850.1 Thus, Cover implies that contemporary
judges suffer in ways significantly similar to the Northern judges of 1850.
In 1975, Ronald Dworkin reviewed Justice Accused and rejected Cover's
claim that there was anything necessary about the dilemma the Northern judges
faced. He argues that judges today have at their disposal a theory of adjudica-
tion that could have solved the moral/formal dilemma faced by judges in
1850.10 Dworkin's theory of adjudication, which will be explored in some
detail below, requires that judges interpret the Constitution in terms of theories
that "make the community's legal record the best it can be from the point of
view of political morality."" If only these judges had applied his theory,
Dworkin argues, they would have seen that the 1850 Act violated the Constitu-
tion. 2 Dworkin's argument seems implausible, however, once one recalls that
the 1793 and 1850 Acts appear consistent with the fugitive slave clause of the
Constitution.13 Further, not only did the Constitution not forbid slavery, but
during the Founding most Northern states displayed none of the concern for
due process rights of alleged slaves that Dworkin finds in the Constitution as
ratified in 1787.14
This Note argues that, properly reconceived, Dworkin's theory of adjudi-
cation could have provided judges with an argument for the unconstitutionality
of the 1850 Act. Part I reviews Cover's argument for placing the Northern
judges in the moral/formal dilemma, and explores the broader consequences
of his claim. Part II argues that Dworkin's solution to the dilemma of the
judges in 1850 does not work. Part III analyzes Dworkin's theory of adjudi-
cation and focuses on its specific application to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion."5 Part IV argues that in order for Dworkin's argument about the unconsti-
tutionality of the 1850 Act to be convincing, it must be reconceived to take into
account the general principles of interpretation suggested in Dworkin's own
8. Formalism means, in part, that "there are certain rules defining the [judicial] office and that, whatever
those rules may be, the judge should obey them." Id. at 124. Cover seems to treat "formalism" and "posi-
tivism" as synonyms. See infra note 9.
9. Positivism "insist[s] on a sharp separation between law and morality." I. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN,
THE PHILOsOPHY OF LAW 29 (1984). Cover himself does not define positivism. See R. COVER, supra note
1, at 257.
10. Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers (Book Review), TIMEs LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5,
1975, at 1437.
11. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 411 (1986).
12. Dworkin, supra note 10, at 1437; also see infra text accompanying note 34.
13.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 [hereinafter the Clause].
14. See Dworkin, supra note 10 at 1437; see also infra text accompanying note 37.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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discussion of Brown.16 Dworkin's theory, as reconceived, is then used to dem-
onstrate the unconstitutionality of the 1850 Act. This Note concludes by
demonstrating how judges using the reformulated Dworkinian approach might
have found the 1850 Act unconstitutional.
An improved Dworkinian argument for the unconstitutionality of the 1850
Act has more value than merely making Dworkin's 1975 claims plausible. Such
an argument serves to undercut Cover's condemnation of the American judicia-
ry. Cover felt strongly that the predicament of the Northern judges was not an
isolated incident; he uses that moment to symbolize the dilemma of adjudication
in American law. Further, in sustaining Dworkin's challenge to Cover, we help
defend Dworkin's theory of adjudication against other, less friendly, critics.
Dworkin is an influential defender of what some have called "judicial activ-
ism"; his theory of law as interpretation seeks to defend the liberal against the
charge that he is legislating from the bench.17 Cover, who was in few respects
a political conservative, mounts a critique that recalls the conservative attack
on Dworkin and his allies.18 It is important to see how Dworkin can confront
this challenge.
I. ThE DILEMMA OF THE NORTHERN JUDGES
Robert Cover argues in Justice Accused that the Fugitive Slave Acts19
created a "moral/formal" dilemma for Northern judges. As judges, these men
had sworn to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the United States. It
seemed apparent to many judges that the federal government's intentions were
clear, that the Acts had been passed by valid majorities in Congress, and that
they were sanctioned by the Constitution. But, as Northern elites, many of them
held strong abolitionist beliefs and considered slavery (and, by extension, the
capture of Blacks for return to a life of slavery) evil. These judges lived in a
world where, with increasing frequency, many politicians, state judges, and
other legal elites were arguing for the rejection of the Fugitive Slave Acts.2°
The dilemma, then, lay between the judges' moral beliefs and their formal legal
obligations.
Cover's conclusion is that the leading legal theory of the age-legal positiv-
ism-so dominated these judges that they could see but not act upon the
appeals made from natural law2 in their courtrooms. Cover concludes that
16. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 387-89.
17. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEIOCRACY AND DISTRUST 58 (1980); see also Dworkin, The Jurisprudence
of Richard Nixon, 17 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 27 (1972).
18. See A. ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 123-30 (1990) (describing the
debate between Allan Hutchinson and Ronald Dworkin over legal interpretation).
19. See supra note 5.
20. See T. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL (1974) (describing political and judicial steps taken in North to
oppose slave-catching); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 157-74 (1965) (describing rise of abolitionism).
21. Under natural law, "no rule can count as a law unless what it requires is at least morally permissi-
ble." L MURPHY & L COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 13.
1991] 1837
The Yale Law Journal
it was the very same technical skill that led these men to be judges that barred
them from acting on their beliefs and rejecting the slave laws.' The consci-
entious application of positivism led to "cognitive dissonance" amongst many
judges of 1850.1 Cover suggests that these judges responded in two ways.
First, they exaggerated the mechanical operation of the law, so as to deny to
themselves any discretion and thereby excuse their failure to act.' Second,
they "raised the formal stakes" in the cases before them by claiming that if
political or moral values were introduced into the process of adjudication, the
authority of the state over all citizens would be eroded.' Put most starkly,
Cover depicts the Northern federal judges of 1850 as saying that in such
morally charged cases as those concerning fugitive slaves, adjudication did not
require moral judgment, and worse, moral judgment would imperil the state's
authority.
Cover clearly believes that nineteenth-century America was entering a
period in which legal positivism would become the preeminent approach to
law.? Although Cover never draws the connection himself, the pre-Civil War
condition described in Justice Accused is generalized in Cover's later writings
examining other periods of American law.27 Cover's American positivism as-
pires to a legal system built of rules whose interpretation require the minimum
of normative judgment by their interpreters.? In this respect Cover's character-
22. "[Tlhere was a general, pervasive disparity between the individual's image of himself as a moral
human being, opposed to human slavery as part of his moral code, and his image of himself as a faithful
judge, applying legal rules impersonally .... R. COVER, supra note 1, at 228.
23. "[lnconsistency among consciously held and articulated principles will generate some tension and
a tendency to try to reduce the area of inconsistency [hence the retreat to formalism]." Id. at 227-28 n.*.
24. Id. at 233.
25. Id. at 231.
26. Id. at 258-59. For support for Cover's analysis, see Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
27. Cover's essay, Nomos and Narrative, for example, suggests a particular mythic self-image of
American legal culture: one in which judges strive to establish rules that are above the specific commitments
of the warring factions of a pluralistic society, and thereby avoid voicing support for one normative commu-
nity over another. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1983); see also Kahn, Community
in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L. 1 1, 62 (1989) (for Cover, American judges exercise
authority to the exclusion of the creation of meaning by communities).
28. Thus, according to Kahn, Cover concludes that, from the perspective of American legal positivism,
"interpretation may remain forever outside of the practical reality of constitutional law." Kahn, supra note
27, at 63. In Nomos and Narrative, for example, Cover argues that the Supreme Court tends to present
adjudication as free of normative commitment. See Cover, supra note 27, at 54-55. Cover is skeptical of
the claim that the federal courts can serve as a neutral arena in which communities living in radically differ-
ent moral worlds (nomoi--for example, the Amish, Hasidim, or Christian Fundamentalists-may reconcile
their differences with the majority or with other groups. He criticizes the Court's opinion in Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), because the Court upheld, on technical grounds, an Internal Revenue
Service decision against extending a tax subsidy to a racist Fundamentalist Christian college. The Court
was clearly unwilling to make explicit that in rejecting the university's claim, it was choosing, in an impor-
tant way, one nomos and its view of the Constitution over another. Here too, Cover sees judicial "cognitive
dissonance." In Bob Jones the Supreme Court retreated into formalism, and tried to minimize the extent
to which its preference for one moral world over another affected the case's outcome. The result is, for
Cover, an incoherent, almost baffling opinion. Cover, supra note 27, at 66-67.
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ization of positivism is, as will be seen below, almost identical to Dworkin's.29
In Nomos and Narrative, Cover implicitly reaffirms the dichotomy set out in
Justice Accused: natural law (normative communal vision)30 on the one side;
positivism (bureaucracy and order) on the other. Cover thus finds the mor-
al/formal dilemma a necessary element of American constitutional interpre-
tation. Cover, then, is a pessimistic positivist: formalistic adjudication can yield
either the unstable, schizophrenic courts described in Justice Accused, or the
soulless, "jurispathic" 31 courts described in Nomos and Narrative. To rebut
Cover's view of adjudication, one would either have to dissolve the moral/
formal dichotomy or show why the dichotomy is in fact not a dilemma. As is
shown below, Dworkin attempts the former.
II. DWORKIN'S SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA
In 1975 Ronald Dworkin reviewed Justice Accused and objected to the idea
that the Northern judges were "forced" into the moral/formal dilemma: "If that
is how the judges saw their predicament, then a failure in jurisprudence contrib-
uted to their dilemma. The debate between natural law and positivism had
squeezed out a third theory of law ... ."As a result, "[Justice] Story and the
others ... endured instead the agony of serving an institution they deplored
... [and] these judges missed a chance to develop an alternative to both natural
law and policy-oriented positivism ...." Dworkin supported his critique
by offering a short argument for the unconstitutionality of the Acts.33 His
argument advances three assumptions about the Constitution: (1) that its con-
ception of individual freedom was antagonistic to slavery; (2) that its concep-
tion of procedural justice was inconsistent with the procedures employed by
the Acts; and (3) that its conception of federalism was inconsistent with the
idea that a state "had no power to supervise the capture of men and women
within its territory."3
A variety of judicial decisions suggest Dworkin's arguments are unconvinc-
ing.35 Dworkin's first prong, the unconstitutionality of slavery, seems impossi-
ble to sustain given that the Constitution specifically regulated slavery and thus
29. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
30. This is not to say that Cover's theory of nomoi is identical to the conventional natural law doctrines
held by contemporary theorists. See, e.g., J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 134-56 (1980).
31. Cover, supra note 27, at 53.
32. Dworkin, supra note 10, at 1437. By "policy-oriented positivism" Dworkin implies an approach
that sees the law as a formal process through which the interests of the state are enforced. Id.
33. In 1986 Dworkin reaffirmed this argument. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 438 n.27.
34. Dworkin, supra note 10, at 1437.
35. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539 (1842); text accompanying infra notes 78-82; see also United States v. Scott, 27 F. Cas. 990, 996
(C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 16,240) (no federal decision could be found that sustained challenge to con-
stitutionality of Acts). A (relatively) modem restatement of the arguments in these cases can be found in
Johnson, The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE L.J. 161 (1921).
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implicitly permitted its existence.36 Dworkin's second prong, the due process
argument, is contradicted by the fact that in 1787 many Northern states had not
yet demonstrated significant concern for the process due alleged slaves,37 and
there is no reason to believe that full due process was necessary at the certifica-
tion stage, since defenders of the 1850 Act described slave-catching as merely
an extradition proceeding after which the alleged slave could receive a full
trial.38 Dworkin's third prong is inconsistent with the federalist argument of
implied powers articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland.39 the Constitution had
created a specific federal guarantee for the return of slaves; the federal power
to enforce that guarantee necessarily was impliedO
If we are to take Dworkin's "third theory of law" seriously, then we must
assume that development of his theory will reveal a missing step between his
unpersuasive conclusions concerning the 1850 Act and his theory's promise of
an escape from formalism. This Note will fill in that missing step; to do this,
however, will require a review of Dworkin's general theory of adjudication.
III. DWORKIN'S GENERAL THEORY AND HIs SOLUTION TO BROWN
In order to locate the "missing step," we must reconstruct what Dworkin
means when he says that Cover's judges suffered from a "failure of jurispru-
dence." In the following section we will review Dworkin's general critique of
two leading American theories of the Constitution, natural law and positiv-
ism.41 The subsequent section will apply Dworkin's general critique to Brown.
A. Dworkin's Critique of Natural Law Theory and Positivism
Dworkin believes that the moral/formal dilemma embraced by Cover is a
trap set up by the positivist in order to make positivism attractive. The trap
creates two artificial categories which bear little relation to legal practice: legal
36. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Slavery is also implicitly referred to at U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3 ("all other Persons" count as three-fifths of "free Persons" for calculating apportionment), art. I, § 9, cl.
3 (Congress may not regulate slave trade until 1808).
37. See Scott, 27 F. Cas. at 996 (Founders did not provide alleged slaves full due process); R. COVER,
supra note 1, at 162-63 (antislavery bar did not make due process arguments until 1820's and 1830's); T.
MORRIS, supra note 20, at 26-27 (due process protections delayed until after 1800).
38. See Scott, 27 F. Cas. at 990-91 (commissioner's task was simple extradition procedure); Miller v.
McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 339-40 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583) (same).
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 400, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate... and all the means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited.., are constitutional").
40. See D. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW & POLITICS 22-25 (1981); Horowitz, Choice-of-Law
Decisions Involving Slavery: "Interest Analysis" in the Earl' Nineteenth Century, 17 UCLA L. REV. 587,
598-600 (1970).
41. This Note does not address the claims made by the Legal Realists or the Critical Legal Studies
movement. Although Dworkin responds to each of these schools of thought, the main thrust of his argument,
since the early 1960's, has been to weave a course between natural law and legal positivism. See R.
DwORKIN, supra note 11, at 36-37, 271-74. Curiously, Cover did not seem to find Legal Realist or CLS
alternatives worthy of much attention in either JUSTICE ACCUSED or Nomos and Narrative.
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positivism ("which insists that law and morals are made wholly distinct by...
rules everyone accepts for using 'law' ") and natural law ("which insists, on the
contrary, that [law and morality] are united").4' The false dichotomy poses
a choice between positivism and natural law, or between setting out the judge's
responsibility as searching for what the law "is" as opposed to what it "ought
to be." Although Dworkin reserves most of his critique for positivism, we
should briefly examine why Dworkin finds natural law theories unacceptable.
Dworkin considers natural law, or what some might call moralism, to be
a form of impermissible judicial activism.43 A natural lawyer would "ignore
the Constitution's text, the history of its enactment, prior decisions of the
Supreme Court interpreting it, and long-standing traditions of our political cul-
ture." A natural lawyer thinks that "the Constitution is only what the best
theory of abstract justice and fairness would produce by way of ideal theo-
ry."45 For example, a natural lawyer might argue that the fugitive slave clause
could never have sanctioned the existence of slavery in any part of the United
States, since that would have contradicted the demands of justice and liberty.
If the natural lawyer argues that she is not ignoring the text of the Constitution,
but instead interpreting its own claims as set forth in the Preamble,4 6 Dwor-
kin's resistance softens, but only slightly. An "interpretivist" natural lawyer
who always found the laws she was interpreting to match her specific moral
beliefs most likely would not be a sincere interpreter.47
Dworkin's real concern is that the specter of moralism will drive judges to
embrace the equally erroneous but more popular theory of legal positivism.
Dworkin sees positivism as erring on the other extreme from natural law: the
positivist claims that normative or moral argument has no role in legal interpre-
tation. According to Dworkin, the positivist claims that "there is no law...
apart from the law drawn from... techniques that are themselves matters of
convention," and therefore "that the past yields no rights tenable in court,
except as these are made uncontroversial by what everyone knows and ex-
pects. '48 In criticisms such as these, Dworkin identifies two major sources of
error which underlie the positivist's position.
The positivist's first error, according to Dworkin, is to imagine that a legal
system is composed entirely of a set of conventions or rules. Dworkin's positi-
vist would like to claim that what are sometimes called legal rules are simply
"plain facts available to all" that are not dependent on an individual's moral
42. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 98.
43. Id. at 378.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 397.
46. U.S. CONST. preamble (Constitution designed, in part, to "establish Justice... promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty"). see also S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS
52-53 (1984).
47. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 104-08.
48. Id. at 116, 118.
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or political judgment. The "plain fact" view of law is designed to characterize
legal interpretation as the reporting of a consensus; thus, even when there is
disagreement over the meaning of a law, it stems from controversy over how
to report a matter of social consensus, much like when linguists disagree over
whether a colloquialism is or is not proper English. Dworkin objects to the
plain fact view because it fails to account for the fact that judges and lawyers
act as if there are right and wrong legal claims even when all sides admit that
there is no social consensus to report. The positivist would have to say that
where there are no clear conventions to be found, there is no law, and if the
interpreter offers a legal conclusion nonetheless, it is through an act of mini-
legislation called discretion.49
Dworkin argues that judges and lawyers act as if there are right legal an-
swers in the absence of consensus because law's meaning is bottomed upon
principles that extend beyond the particular instances of consensus referred to
by a case or in a framer's report. Law possesses this "internal logic" because
it is an "interpretive concept": a community's law has "a certain structure...
such that particular substantive theories can be identified and understood as
subinterpretations of a more abstract idea." 50
Interpretive concepts-which are found, for example, in art as well as
law51-are in a constant state of flux, and the challenge, Dworkin believes,
is to identify which new developments are true to the central structure of the
concept. Dworkin's picture of interpretation revolves around the idea of con-
stant revision: the interpreter constantly checks new developments in a practice
against paradigm examples of the practice that are understood to instantiate the
central structure. Usually an interpreter will reject a substantially new approach
because it fails to match the paradigms and hence is outside the interpretive
concept. Occasionally, however, an interpreter will perceive that the interpretive
concept embraces a new approach that fails to match a current paradigm. The
interpreter accepts the approach, because she realizes that although "[p]aradigms
anchor interpretations ... no paradigm is secure from challenge by a new inter-
pretation that accounts for other paradigms better and leaves that one isolated
as a mistake. '52 Since the possibility of revision is constant, each interpreter
must ask herself at each instance of interpretation, is this a time for revision?
Because this question requires an inquiry into more than the simple exis-
tence of a social consensus, the positivist provides an inadequate description
of legal interpretation. Yet Dworkin's interpretive attitude is no friend to natural
law: while the revision of paradigm cases is an intensely normative activity,
it is not identical to an interpreter's choosing according to her own taste, since
the idea is to select those cases that best exemplify the practice as the interpret-
49. Id. at 37-43.
50. Id. at 71.
51. See e.g. id. at 56-57 (Dworkin's discussion of S. Cavell's reading of Fellini's La Strada).
52. Id. at 72.
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er found it. For the interpreter to replace a paradigm because and only because
she does not like it, for reasons not rooted in the other paradigms remaining
in the concept being interpreted, is invention, not interpretation.
The positivist's second error, according to Dworkin, is to conclude that
whenever judges make legal judgments that do not refer to a settled social
consensus, the judgments are exercises of discretion in which the judge's
personal moral or political preferences are given the force of law. As we saw
above, Dworkin attributes this error to a common misunderstanding about the
nature of interpretation.
Dworkin considers interpretation to be an activity in which an individual
attempts to extend and refine the core structure of a practice and not simply
impose her own preferences. Dworkin distinguishes between asking what the
Constitution as a single coherent structure means, and asking about either what
any single author originally meant or asking about what a majority of the
interpreter's contemporaries think the text means. 3 Thus, according to
Dworkin's view of law as interpretation, a faithful judge knows that he may
be required to improve or revise the "values" of a legal system with which he
personally disagrees in the course of determining whether a putative law is part
of the legal system.
Dworkin argues that we can talk about what the law really requires, inde-
pendent of simply aggregating the intentions of those involved in creating or
maintaining the law, because the logic of the core structure of a practice can
yield a purpose of which even its authors were not aware.' In the case of law,
the core structure is built around the fact that the acts of a political community
are not justifiable unless they satisfy the dual demands of justice and fair-
ness, 55 and this may commit those engaged in legal interpretation to the law
in ways which they may not have anticipated 6
We now can understand Dworkin's answer to the positivist's second mis-
53. "[Elach of the participants in a social practice must distinguish between trying to decide what other
members of his community think the practice requires and trying to decide, for himself, what it really re-
quires." Id. at 64.
One might object that the real danger comes not from the interpreter who defers to her contemporaries,
but the interpreter who invents the meaning of the practice by introducing a purely personal preference and
calling it a product of social interpretation. We must be careful, however, to avoid confusing different
explanations for this sort of subjectivism. A theory such as Legal Realism would argue that interpretation
is always and inevitably a subjective enterprise, and that its appearance is a central part of a normal legal
system. See, e.g. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 36 (1931). Dworkin's theory acknowledges the
risk of subjectivism, but argues that legal systems are no more likely to be noninterpretable than the social
phenomenon of language. See R. DWoRKN, supra note 11, at 261-62 (rejecting "global internal" skepticism).
54. R. DwoRKN, supra note 11, at 54-59.
55. Dworkin defines justice as "a matter of outcomes: a political decision causes injustice, however
fair the procedures that produced it, when it denies people some resource, liberty, or opportunity that the
best theories of justice entitle them to have." Id. at 180. He defines political fairness as follows: "that each
person or group in the community should have a roughly equal share of control over the decisions made
by Parliament or Congress... ." Id. at 178.
56. "The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far
as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author-the community personi-
fled-expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness." Id. at 225.
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take. Law, as an interpretive practice, has a purpose or point that is governed
by the internal logic of its core values. Those core values are roughly described
by the term "integrity," which encompasses the dual values of justice and
fairness. 57 Any particular instantiation of a legal system's purpose, however,
is a matter of interpretation in which a judge's decision to revise or confirm
the status quo is to be based on the judge's own attempt to understand the
purpose of the legal system, given all she knows about it. The internal logic
of legal practice admits of the possibility that an interpreter will draw conclu-
sions that are novel. Therefore, it is not true that every legal rule which does
not fit into the current consensus among lawyers is an act of invention.
B. Applying Dworkin to Brown
This Note's principal objection to Dworkin's argument concerning the 1850
Act was that it was unclear how he could reconcile his theoretical objections
to Cover with the practical interpretive difficulties he faced. This "missing
step," as it was called above, can be discovered by looking at how Dworkin's
theory works in practice. A fitting guide is Brown v. Board of Education, which
Dworkin treats as an important exemplar of his theory of adjudication.
The important practical principle of interpretation contained in Dworkin's
analysis of Brown is that what we know about changes in social conditions and
political morality must be taken into account when we try to understand how
an interpreter discovers which of many possible political theories best represents
the constitutional principle at stake. Thus, Dworkin's argument that "separate
but equal" may have fit legal practice in 1896 but not in 1954 captures why
he thinks that his theory of adjudication is neither a version of natural law nor
of positivism: his theory allows written rules to constrain, yet grounds those
constraints in the judge's best understanding of what the law, as a coherent set
of principles representing the state as a single actor, requires.
The problem Dworkin confronts in explaining Brown is that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment probably never intended the equal protection
clause to be used to prevent state segregation of schools.58 For Dworkin,
Framers' intentions are neither dispositive nor insignificant. Intention is sig-
nificant, to an extent, yet only in a special way: the Founders' intention is part
of the community's "political record"; it carries weight only because it is an
excellent indicator of core elements of the legal system's purposes that have
survived across time. 9 That this should be so is easy to see: the discussion
57. Id. at 243.
58. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 38-44 (1977); Bickel, The Original Understanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 58 (1955).
59. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 365. Recall that for Dworkin, judges ought to be interested in the
purposes of the laws or legal system, and not necessarily in the intentions of those who wrote or later inter-
preted the laws in the legal system.
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of interpretation above assumed that an interpreter begins with the practice he
is given. Practices-especially those largely constituted by statutes and legal
decisions-have approximate beginnings and relatively definite groups of au-
thors. The origins of the practice, while not wholly controlling the practice's
meaning, will almost certainly be an important source of meaning for any
subsequent interpreter. But since an interpreter is interested in the law's purpos-
es, he must consider the possibility that past interpreters, including framers,
misapplied some portion of the core structure of the law.
60
In explaining how Brown and Plessy v. Ferguson61 could both be faithful
interpretations of the Constitution, Dworkin hypothesizes that even if the same
core principle of equal protection were understood by the Supreme Courts of
1896 and 1954, each could have properly drawn opposite conclusions on the
constitutional permissibility of "separate but equal" racial segregation because
in testing the law they used different constitutional theories of racial equality,
each of which was adequate for its time.62
Dworkin's argument in the case of Brown is that the theory of racial
equality upon which Plessy was decided may have been "adequate under the
tests of [integrity] at some time in our history," but it clearly was not adequate
in 1954.63 Dworkin argues that the interpretation of equal protection that was
adequate in 1896 was no longer adequate in 1954 because the theory of racial
equality upon which Plessy was decided was implausible in 1954: "The Ameri-
can people would almost unanimously have rejected it" and so would have, one
60. An easy example of this would be the case of corporate personhood. It may be that each Framer
in 1787 specifically understood that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause did not protect corporations.
Yet in the 1880's a judge who believed that a corporation was a person under the Constitution would
interpret the meaning of the Fifth Amendment consistently with that belief. Compare Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (corporations are "persons" within meaning of due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment) with Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment,
47 YALE LJ. 371, 375 (1938) (Framers of Fourteenth Amendment did not necessarily intend to treat
corporations as persons). The judge's use of the Framers' statements as well as a dictionary published in
1880 would both be appropriate; the weight he places on each as a resource is a question of interpretive
technique. But the judge wants to know what the words mean according to the logic of the core structure
of the Constitution (and American law as a practice)-not what it meant to the Framers, and not what it
meant to the majority of dictionary writers of his time. Nonetheless, it would be highly unusual if there were
not a close correlation between the judge's use of the word and its use in contemporary political culture.
61. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state "separate but equal" racial segregation law).
62. The theory of racial equality upon which Plessy might have relied is restated by Dworkin in the
following form. "[I]t supposes... that people have no distinct right not to be the victim of racial or other
discrimination beyond what the rationality restraint already requires .... [Thus] the standard requires only
that [racial] groups receive the right consideration in the overall balance ... even though it treats them
differently from others." R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 383. Dworkin suggests that this theory of counting
majority preferences regardless of their object could have been the theory of racial equality that the Supreme
Court employed in 1896, and that an interpretation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment based on this theory could have been an "adequate" interpretation. Id. at 387. In order to accept
Dworkin's interpretation of Plessy, one would have to accept (i) that it was plausible that in 1896 judges
believed the theory of racial equality described above to be true, and (ii) that for judges to have adopted
this theory of racial equality would have been a faithful extension of the core principle of equal protection.
63. Id.
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presumes, America's judges.'
Despite one's discomfort with Dworkin's analysis of the Plessy Court's
reasoning, this example provides a good illustration of law as interpretation.'
In this case, the meaning of the Constitution is revised because Justices in 1954
came to a different conclusion than Justices in 1896 about whether separate but
equal was constitutional. This occurred when the 1954 Justices concluded that
the core structure of the Constitution (as manifested in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) was different from how the 1896 Justices understood this structure. The
1954 Justices came to a new conclusion about the Constitution because they
adopted a theory of racial equality different from that of the 1896 Justices.
IV. INTERPRETING THE FUGITIVE SLAVE CLAUSE
Part I demonstrated that Dworkin offers three unpersuasive reasons for why
nineteenth-century judges held the 1850 Act unconstitutional. The principle that
connects Dworkin's theory to his practical conclusions in Brown, however, can
provide the missing step in Dworkin's argument for the unconstitutionality of
the 1850 Act.
It must be noted at the outset that Dworkin's first prong still cannot play
a central role in his argument. Because the revised argument is to turn on a new
understanding of the political morality of the mid-1800's, this argument must
recognize that popular rejection of the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Acts does not mean popular rejection of the constitutionality of slavery. With
the exception of some Constitutional Utopians,66 few argued that the Constitu-
tion, with its implicit references to slavery, did not actually permit slavery in
some parts of the country. Further, it would have been hard for someone to
argue in 1840 that the Constitution actively forbade slavery. Slavery was a
matter of state law, and it is unlikely that Dworkin could generate not only a
64. Id. We are interested in the preferences of people who lived when the judge lived only to the extent
that they illuminate the judge's beliefs. In the case of Brown, Dworkin finds it useful to note, in trying to
narrow the range of theories that federal judges could have employed, that the theory employed in Plessy
was not generally accepted. That fact suggests, in the absence of contrary indications, that the federal judges
would not have accepted it either. Part IV, infra, refers to changes in political morality in contrasting a
judge's understanding of the fugitive slave clause with that of the Founders. Because the constitutional
attitudes of Northern judges were strongly influenced by the great debates then occurring over the status
of slavery, it seems appropriate to use sources describing Northern elites' political morality as an approx-
imate indicator of the beliefs of individual constitutional interpreters.
65. It must be noted that Dworkin's own argument fails on the facts of Brown: The Court in Brown
addressed whether segregated schools could ever be equal, and not whether the white majority's preferences
with regard to race could ever be taken into account in the democratic process. Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954); see also Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800-01 (1983) (implying that Brown does not establish a
general principle of race-neutrality). This criticism of Dworkin's conclusion in the case of Brown should
not distract from analysis of his method, which is the point of this example.
66. See R. COVER, supra note 1, at 154-55; see. e.g. A. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERIcAN
ABOLITIONISM 185-86 (1967); L. PERRY, RADICAL ABOLMONISM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
GOD IN ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT 161 (1973).
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federal prohibition against slavery, but also some theory of federal common law
or federal rights applicable to the states to enforce that prohibition. The Con-
stitution did not approve of slavery, nor did it disapprove of it: its three men-
tions of the institution regulated a practice which the text could have outlawed
but did not (until the Thirteenth Amendment).
The theory of interpretation found in Brown can, however, help reformulate
and defend the second and third prongs of Dworkin's claim. A combination of
these two prongs rebuts the objections to Dworkin's arguments by offering the
following claim: the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was not constitutional because
its application, given the conditions of 1850, violated the principle of comity
that allowed the free states to tolerate slavery without compromising the
demands of their own legal practices.
This argument can be modeled after the form of argument Dworkin uses
to justify Brown. Little information exists about the intentions and purposes of
the Framers of the fugitive slave clause.67 As we saw above, however, Dwor-
kin argues that the goal of constitutional interpretation is not to describe the
specific state of affairs the Framers intended, but rather to describe the general
principle they hoped to build into the Constitution. Just as Dworkin was able
to describe a general principle of the Fourteenth Amendment that was "cor-
rectly" instantiated by different theories of racial equality at different times, he
can do the same with the principle expressed by the fugitive slave clause. The
Clause required-most generally-that each state respect the laws of its neigh-
bor, more specifically, it required the states that forbid slavery to deliver
runaway slaves to the states that had slavery.68 But as with the "principle" of
racial equality contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, this "principle" of
fugitive comity could have had many different theoretical instantiations. One
theory Dworkin could advance is as follows: The Constitution, in order to leave
questions of the treatment of Blacks within their borders up to each state, could
not replace the laws governing the internal regulation of Blacks with federal
laws that, in effect, substituted the laws of another state.
67. The Clause was introduced late in the Convention, raised little debate, and was passed unanimously.
See Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution's Origins, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167, 178 (L. Levy & D. Mahoney eds. 1987). The Convention went
out of its way to insure that the Clause did not suggest that slavery was approved by federal law. See D.
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 40, at 12-14; J. Smith, The Federal Courts and the Black Man in America, 1800-
1883, at 147 n.3 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1977). It is generally ac-
cepted that the collective intent of the Framers, to the extent that one existed, was to mollify both anti- and
proslavery sides in order to achieve union. See D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 40, at 14. This claim should
not be confused with the popular myth that without the Clause, ratification would have been impossible.
Id. at 21.
68. It is interesting that legal argument concerning interstate comity and slavery did not invoke the
full faith and credit clause. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. In the 1780's "it was almost axiomatic that the
operation of 'normal' ... reciprocity would not lead to the recognition by one state of the slave property
of another." R. COVER, supra note 1, at 88. Therefore, in 1787, the operation of the full faith and credit
clause (and the conflict of law doctrines against which it was interpreted) on the states' laws on slavery
was superseded by the fugitive slave clause and the doctrine that arose around it. See T. MORRIS, supra
note 20, at 18.
1991] 1847
The Yale Law Journal
If the Clause is read to refer to this theory, then Dworkin's attack on the
1850 Act can be made on two fronts. First, the Clause, which at root was con-
cerned with the states' obligation to return runaways, cannot be read as having
granted the federal courts the power to invalidate state processes simply because
they were slow or-in the eyes of other states-obstructionist. Thus, the Clause
should never have been read to forbid state governments from making funda-
mental choices about the process necessary for a slave to be "delivered up" to
a slave state. Second, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment limited
the sort of processes the federal government could erect to ensure the return
of runaway slaves. 69 Unless the process due an accused Black was at least
equal to that of the state in which the federal proceeding took place, the
"home" state's "pro-Black" processes were being derogated in favor of a
Southern state's "anti-Black" processes. These two issues, however, are merely
logical extensions of the same central issue, which is: what limits did the
fugitive slave clause place on the federal government's power to decide how
alleged slaves were to be treated within the Northern states' territory?
This note will not argue that the Clause was necessarily inconsistent with
the 1793 Act. It will argue, paralleling Dworkin's argument concerning Brown,
that even if there existed a theory of fugitive comity that permitted limitations
on state regulation of the treatment of Blacks within their borders at the time
of the Framing, there is ample evidence that the political morality of Northern
elites had rejected this theory by 1850. This morality, in turn, shaped a different
theory of comity that would have allowed these judges to strike down the Act.
The theory of interstate comity available to judges in the 1790's and the
early nineteenth century may have been something like the following: In order
to respect each state's views on slavery, federal law guarantees the slave states
their citizens' property rights in slaves in the United States. This theory as-
sumes that the protection of Southern property rights would not conflict with
Northern states' domestic law. This assumption may have been credible when
Northern states had no body of domestic law designed to address the treatment
of accused slaves by domestic or foreign actors. If the laws of Northern states
did not conflict with the extraterritorial claims of residents of Southern states,
and federal law went no further than to enforce Southern claims, then the
principle of comity described above would be consistent with the 1793 Act. A
change in conditions-in both the nature of the Northern states' relation to
slave-catching and the attitude of Northern governments toward slave-catch-
ing-made the Clause's principle of comity incompatible with either Act,
however.
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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A. The Clause and Federal Interference
The Clause does not grant the power to regulate or facilitate the capture of
slaves to the federal government. This power was extended to the federal
government in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.70 By creating a federal process
parallel to the state processes referred to by the Clause, the Act went beyond
the language of the Clause. And yet the Act left many elements in the process
of removal vague. 71 Although not the case in 1793, at a certain point the
federal policy embodied in the Act was bound to conflict with any given state's
interest in the operation of its laws with regard to fugitives within its borders.
The principle of comity changed between 1793 and 1850 as the world changed.
In the early years of the 1793 Act there were few Northern laws about slave-
catching to conflict with Southern laws. There was simply much less reason
for the Northern states to legislate on the issue of fugitives: the lack of an
organized abolition movement meant fewer slaves coming across the border and
less popular outrage at the slave-catchers who would enter Northern towns and
forcibly remove Blacks to Southern states and inevitably to bondage.72 The
gradual transformation in Northern political morality is illustrated by the rise
of "personal liberty" laws,73 as well as an increase in both the frequency and
70.
(Tihe person to whom such labour or service may be due... is hereby empowered to seize or
arrest such fugitive from labour, and to take him or her before any judge of the circuit or district
courts of the United States, residing or being within the state, or before any magistrate of a coun-
ty, city or town.., and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral
testimony or affidavit taken before [shall be certified for removal] ....
Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). It is an interesting question whether Congress had the power
to legislate with regard to the regulation of the capture of fugitives, since the fugitive slave clause is in
Article IV, and Congress's powers are enumerated exclusively in Article I.
71. How, for example, could a party get an accused slave to a court-through violence, or only through
the means approved by the plenary power of the state in which the slave-catcher operated? See D. ROBIN-
SON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-85, at 286 (1971) ("[The Act's] adminis-
trative procedures were so cumbersome.., that it was a 'dead letter' from the start in regions where public
sympathies were hostile to slavery."). On the other hand, Fehrenbacher calls the Act "an invitation to kid-
napping." D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 40, at 21. Would the accused slave have a right to confront his
accuser? See Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62 (Pa. 1819) (state court cannot interpose right to jury
trial in the rendition process).
72. See R. COVER, supra note 1, at 159-60; L Smith, supra note 67, at 164-65 (national fugitive slave
policy "stirred relatively little controversy among public" until 1830's). As William Nelson has shown,
Northern elites did not come to see Southern domestic slave laws and practices as a threat to the integrity
of the domestic affairs of Northern states until the 1830's and 1840's. See Nelson, The Impact of the
Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV.
513, 533 (1974).
73. These laws were originally passed by Northern legislatures to prevent overzealous slave-catchers
from kidnapping free Blacks, but they eventually became an effective mechanism for Northern legislatures
to express their increasing impatience with the extension of the tactics of "slave law" into free states even
in the pursuit of a "bona fide" slave. See T. MORRIS, supra, note 20, at 94-147; L Smith, supra note 67,
at 165.
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severity of Northern reaction to the use of the 1793 Act by Southern slaveown-
ers.
74
In the face of this changing political morality in the North, the Clause
forced judges into an inescapable dilemma. On the one hand, the Clause specifi-
cally called upon states to cooperate in the return of slaves; one could see this
federal instruction as a commitment on the part of the federal government to
ensure that conflicts over slaves were regulated by more than the usual "inter-
state comity" rules that governed choice of law disputes.75 On the other hand,
as Northern states passed more laws regulating how slaves were to be caught
within their territory,76 the federal involvement in slave-catching necessarily
had to express a preference in upholding either the North's or the South's
conception of how slaves were to be caught. Since the activity always took
place in the North, to uphold the Southern conception would increasingly void
Northern laws regulating conduct within their own borders.
This Note's revision of the Dworkinian argument rests on the claim that
for Northern states to curb their personal liberty laws (or to choose not to pass
them out of regard for the Clause) would have violated the Clause's commit-
ment to the principle of comity described above. It would be misleading to say
that the free states were, in any significant way, adopting a view about the
treatment of Blacks simply by omitting to act in a way that opposed a slave
state's interests. However, once the free states developed and articulated a
view-upon which they based positive state action-about how alleged slaves
should be treated, then each time they curbed their sense of what process was
due, and acted because of the slave states' interests, they were coerced into
choosing the Southern regime over their own. That is why Dworkin can say
that the change in the political morality and actions in the North made demands
on the Clause that exposed its incompatibility with the Acts. Once that point
was reached, to the extent that the Northern states were obliged to act because
of the Constitution, the Constitution was not just protecting the slaveholder's
74. By the 1830's the political ambitions of abolitionism extended beyond what may have once been
the province of fringe groups. See, e.g., R. COVER, supra note 1, at 253-54 (in 1859, Ohio Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Swan not reelected because of antiabolitionist decision in habeas corpus case (Ex parte
Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859)); in same year, Governor Salmon Chase pledged to use state militia to
enforce order of state court to release federal prisoners arrested under 1850 Act); see also id. at 176 (in
1853, after Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to issue writ of habeas corpus to accused slave in federal
custody, state constitutional convention called to amend Massachusetts constitution to provide for elected
judiciary). In addition to formal opposition, there were many episodes of vigilantism in which abolitionists
covertly rescued slaves from slave-catchers and federal marshals. See Levy, Sim's Case: The Fugitive Slave
Law in Boston in 1851, 35 J. NEGRO HIsT. 39 (1950).
75. See Horowitz, supra note 40; Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
74 (1971).
76. An example of such a law is offered in G. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO
SLAVERY 115 (1856) (requiring Pennsylvaniajudge or magistrate to take extensive affidavits when enforcing
1793 Act).
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interest in his slave, but forcing the North to respect that interest through
procedures infected with the assumptions of slavery.77
For the reasons outlined above, Dworkin should look skeptically upon the
arguments made in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.78 Justice Story, speaking for the
Court, rejected the argument that the return of slaves was a matter of simple
interstate comity, and, as a good student of Marshall, argued that since the
Constitution guaranteed slaveowners' right of reclamation, there was an "im-
plied power" on the part of Congress to enforce that right.79 Justice Story an-
ticipated, but rejected, the Dworkinian argument about changes in political
morality resulting in a change in Congress' power to regulate slavery.80 It is
interesting that Justice Story (as well as a plurality of the Court) could not bring
himself to part completely with the idea that the states could not choose to
recuse themselves from slave-catching while obeying the federal command to
cooperate with the slave-catchers. Dicta in Prigg, written by Justice Story,
argues that the enforcement of the Constitution's command to return slaves was
not only not a matter of conventional interstate comity, but in fact was a matter
of exclusively federal concern.81 Accordingly, Story concluded that since there
was no obligation on the states to enforce the 1793 Act, Pennsylvania was
entitled to prohibit its own magistrates from hearing cases brought under the
federal statute.82
Chief Justice Taney, who wrote a concurring opinion, strongly disagreed
with Justice Story's willingness to uphold Pennsylvania's freedom to remove
itself from the business of enforcing slaveholders' rights. He saw the contradic-
tion that was explored in our Dworkinian argument above: why would Pennsyl-
vania's prohibition not have the same inhibitory effect on national fugitive slave
policy that Pennsylvania's antikidnapping law was declared to have?83
The tension concealed in Story's opinion came to light in the years follow-
ing Prigg, when many Northern states passed laws regulating the conduct of
77. As one commentator observed, "[By 1850] [flederal enforcement of the fugitive slave clause...
gave the southern law of slavery an imperial, extrajurisdictional force within the free states .... The effect
was to make slaveholding rights national in scope." D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 40, at 24.
78. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). This decision was an early attempt to address with a Pennsylvania
personal liberty law and set the stage for the conflicts that led to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. In Prigg,
the Court struck down as unconstitutional a law which (i) banned the forcible seizure of Blacks with the
intent to return them to a slave state, and (ii) denied to Pennsylvania's magistrates authority to hear any
claim brought before them under the 1793 Act. See T. MoRRis, supra note 20, at 52-53. Prigg, a Maryland
slave-catcher, had been convicted of kidnapping under the Pennsylvania law.
79. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615-16.
80. Story noted that the Constitution's explicit reference to the return of slaves and the federal power
it implies should withstand the changing course of public opinion and "the mutations of public policy." Id.
at 611-14.
81. Id. at 623; see also J. Smith, supra note 67, at 167-68.
82. For an alternative account of Story's reasoning in Prigg, see Note, Justice Story, Slavery, and the
Natural Law Foundations ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 273 (1988) (arguing that Story,
through use of theory of natural law, could accommodate both his fundamental rejection of slavery and his
fundamental commitment to nationalism).
83. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 627-33 (Taney, C.J., concurring); see also 3. Smith, supra note 67, at
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their own state officers that were clearly designed to render impractical the
enforcement of the federal laws, leading eventually to the passage of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.8' The 1850 Act, however, did not really resolve
the tension as much as it tried to solve it by fiat. As has been suggested, in the
years that followed Prigg, Northern states had begun to develop a coherent
policy as to the treatment of fugitive slaves such that in regulating civil life
within their territory, these states were taking positive steps toward preventing
slave-catching.85 The Court's optimism that federal law could coexist with
state inactivity became untenable as soon as state regulation with regard to the
due process necessary to remove a fugitive slave began to look more and more
like Pennsylvania's unconstitutional antikidnapping law.
86
B. The Clause and Due Process
The Section above demonstrated that by 1850, the Clause could not have
been read to allow unconstrained federal regulation of slave-catching. A related
and important point is that even if the Clause were viewed as giving the federal
government the power to enforce the Northern states' obligations as set out in
the Clause (to "deliver up" slaves), this still does not mean that the federal
process used could violate contemporary state standards of due process. A
conflict still remained concerning the extent to which the federal rules should
reflect the Northern states' belief that any Black brought before a court in the
North should enjoy the presumption that she was free until proven otherwise,
and the Southern belief that proceedings in the North were little more than sum-
84. See T. MORRIS, supra note 20, at 107-129. William Story argues that his father intended to sabotage
the Southern slave-catching efforts by building this tension into Prigg. W. STORY, LaFE AND LETTERS OF
JOSEPH STORY 397-98 (1851).
85. See J. Smith, supra note 67, at 172.
86. Someone who accepts Dworkin's theory of interpretation might still make the following objection
at this point: why not interpret the passage of the 1850 compromise as an indication of the political culture
of the nation and thus as a good approximation of the best theory of the fugitive slave clause available to
judges at the time? After all, were not the congressmen who voted for the compromise themselves members
of the elite class to which the judges belonged? If Congress believed the Act constitutional, and accepted
the Act's picture of federalism, why not assume that this gives us a reliable clue as to the best theory of
the clause? To put this objection another way: Dworkin takes advantage of the fact that "no one" believed
the Plessy theory of racial equality in 1954 (neither the South nor the North); yet the theory of the clause
Dworkin wants to discount seemed quite popular in 1850; it was endorsed in national legislation. Dworkin
must explain why we should not interpret this disanalogy to mean that even if his theory is correct, the facts
of 1850 do not lend themselves to his specific conclusion.
This objection takes too simple a view of how one is supposed to use the fact of changing political
culture as "evidence" in Dworkin's theory. One is not supposed to take a simple majoritarian headcount:
that returns the theory back to a crude form of positivism. One attempts to obtain an approximation of
information which cannot be obtained firsthand: the range of theories actually available to a judge living
in 1850. While it is true that the theory "endorsed" by the Compromise of 1850 was certainly a contender
at the time, we know also of its rival, the theory of the Compromise's opponents. The depth and strength
of opposition to the Compromise of 1850 was significant. See J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850, at 64 (A. Nevins ed. 1966) (leading Northerners repudiated Daniel
Webster's decision to work with Henry Clay toward a Senate bill); see also D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note
40, at 80 (at no time did entire package of amendments to 1793 Act garner majority in House).
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mary extradition hearings, where the presumption was reversed, and that any
alleged slave could get a full and fair hearing once they were returned to the
state of their alleged master.'
Here too, the Dworkinian argument inspired by Brown may be used. We
should recall what we determined to be the Clause's general principle: comity
between the states with regard to how Blacks were to be treated within their
borders. Until 1850, there was no special federal procedure for slave-catching,
since there were no special federal officers like commissioners. 8 Until 1850,
federal judges (if they ever heard a runaway case) 9 applied the procedure of
the state in which they sat.90 This reflected the Clause's general commitment
to comity. Under the pre-1850 scheme, as conceptions of due process changed
in a Northern state, the federal procedure, which relied on state procedure, thus
changed accordingly. Until 1850, a Dworkinian interpreter could claim that the
Clause did not permit a person domiciled in Pennsylvania to receive federal
procedural protections so thin that, in effect, that person's only real hearing was
in South Carolina, with South Carolina "procedure." The denial of this interpre-
tation would provide slave-catchers with guaranteed access to Southern slave
law in every fugitive slave case: upon seizing a Black in the North, they then
would need only to invoke a shred of federal procedure in order legitimately
to introduce Southern law.91 On the other hand, obedience to the principle of
comity would, according to our Dworkinian interpretation, require that federal
due process treat Blacks with at least that process they would have received
in the state in which they were seized. 92
Despite the many objections made by courts that clearly support the Dwork-
87. See R. COVER, supra note 1, at 163-64; J. Smith, supra note 67, at 155-56 (citing 1850 statement
of Sen. Roger Baldwin (Conn.)).
88. The Article I commissioner "was to hear the slaveholder or his representative or examine their
affidavits, ex parte, and issue certificates thereon .... Moreover, the act explicitly excluded the alleged
fugitive's testimony from the proceeding." R. COVER, supra note 1, at 175 (footnote omitted).
89. "In fact, under the act of 1793, nearly all the cases fell into the hands of a few justices of thepeace
in each particular locality .... " G. STROUD, supra note 76, at 111-12.
90. "According to the Judiciary Act of 1789, the laws of the several states would be the rules of
decision in federal courts so that ajurist in a free state could, if he chose, bring the fugitive act into harmony
with the Judiciary Act" by employing the procedure of his state. T. MORRIS, supra note 20, at 21 (footnote
omitted).
91. See D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 40, at 24; G. STROUD, supra note 76, at 113 ("A fair trial for
freedom IN A SLAVE STATE, by a negro born in a FREE ONE, is impossible").
92. The Dworkinian arguments above were made in less theoretical language but through more precise
objections by politicians and lawyers of the time. The specific violations of due process that were alleged
against the 1850 Act were (i) the lack of a full jury trial; (ii) the denial of the alleged slave's right to enter
any statement before the federal commissioner (ili) the fact that the decisionmaker was not an Article II
judge but rather an Article I officer, and finally, (iv) the small yet symbolic fact that the commissioner
received five dollars for every Black determined to be free and ten dollars for every Black sent to the South.
See R. COVER, supra note 1, at 175; J. Smith, supra note 67, at 160-61. During the debates on the 1850
Act, Senator Roger Baldwin of Connecticut raised many of these concerns. CONG. GLOBE, 31st. Cong., Ist
Sess. 421 (1850). For due process challenges raised in court, see Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D.
Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583) (holding process required no greater than for extradition, even though "power of
the master may be so exercised as to defeat a trial [in the slave state]"); Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 F.
Cas. 1007 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 18,261).
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inian point that the 1850 Act violated the principle of neutrality contained in
the Clause, few judges propounded explicitly Dworkinian arguments. One set
of cases that did frame the debate around the terms defined above, however,
occurred when the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the 1850 Act unconstitu-
tional. In In re Booth,93 the appellants obtained a writ of habeas corpus from
the Wisconsin State Supreme Court after being arrested on federal charges of
abetting the escape of a slave. The Wisconsin court held that they could not
be held on charges of interference since these were based on the 1850 Act and
the 1850 Act was void for unconstitutionality. 4 After the Wisconsin court
refused to return any writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court
overturned the Wisconsin decision from a certified record.95
V. CONCLUSION
We have found and applied the missing step in Dworkin's argument: the
theory of comity which correctly represents that the principle for which the
Clause stood in 1850 was different from the theory that was correct for 1793.
That the Northern states were still obligated to "deliver up" runaway slaves was
never in question. The interpretive problem that law as integrity attempts to
solve was the extent to which Northern procedure, if used, could interfere with
Southern demands for a certain type of delivery.
Dworkin's specific argument about the 1850 Act suggests that Cover's
depiction of adjudication in hard cases is a misdescription with serious political
consequences. If adjudication in hard cases requires estrangement from one's
political commitments, then Cover simultaneously discourages people with
political commitments from choosing to become, or remain, judges, while
licensing those who remain judges to discount the role of political commitment
in the interpretation of the Constitution.96 Cover's pessimistic view of adjudi-
cation is not necessarily correct. Judges in 1850 were not trapped between the
formalism of following evil rules or the moral commands of their consciences.
93. 3 Ws. 1 (1854).
94. Id. at 66. The court held that the 1850 Act violated the due process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment. The opinion by Justice Smith is the best example of the Wisconsin court's Dworkinian
reasoning. He argued that the purpose of the Clause was to permit each state to determine whether an alleged
slave was really "due to the party who claims him," and argued that the result of the holding in Prigg was
that "[t]he slave code of every State in the Union is thus engrafted upon the laws of every free State." Id.
at 122. He also recognized the potential conflict between the Clause and both Prigg and the 1850 Act that
is noted supra text accompanying notes 83-84. Id. at 124-26; see also In re Booth and Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157
(1854) (enforcing decision in Booth).
95. In a unanimous decision, the Court rejected the Wisconsin court's power to overturn federal
precedent. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506,514 (1858); see also R. COVER supra note I, at 187;
T. MoRRs, supra note 20, at 174-80.
96. It is telling, then, that Cover and Dworkin both acknowledge in the prefaces to their first books
that for each, their purpose was to respond to the actions of judges during the 1960's: Cover, to condemn
the "judicial complicity in the crimes of Vietnam" by identifying formalism in adjudication; and Dworkin,
to celebrate the Warren Court's "liberal theory of law." R. COVER, supra note 1, at xi; R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTs SERIOUsLY at vii (1977).
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